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Abstract: 
The objective of this project is to assess the impact of Somalia’s 4.5 power 
sharing formula on the consolidation of post-conflict governance. Per the peace 
agreement, seats in parliament are awarded to the four major clans which also dominate 
the election process. This has led to the perpetuation of many of the same social 
dynamics that lead to conflict in the past. Even though the 4.5 formula was not included 
in the constitution adopted in 2012, the elections methods from the formula were utilized 
in 2017 presidential elections. Although the goal is to move towards a one-man-one vote 
system, the use of the 4.5 formula in the 2017 elections points to a struggle in 
establishing this process. This project will argue that clan influence is likely to remain a 
challenge for Somalia’s transition to democracy until a civilian based voting system is 
put into place. This research employed the works Ball (1996) and Papagianni (2007) to 
analyze the success as well as the failures of rebuilding Somalia and impact of the 4.5 
formula had on this process.
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Introduction  
Since the formation of the Somali state, clans have been actors in both governance 
and conflict in Somalia (Lewis, 1972; Samatar and Samatar, 1987; Samatar, 1992; 
Luling, 1997; Besteman, 1996). Prior to independence, clans played an important social 
role and were a source of protection and identity for the population. However, during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods, clans were co-opted as a tool for gaining access to 
resource and power. This has created lasting divisions in the society that were politicized 
again during Somalia’s lengthy civil war. These divisions stemmed from Siad Barre’s 
utilization of clan during his 21-year rule over Somalia. His use of clan as a tool to stay in 
power and reward his allies led to the creation of revolutionary militias. After the civil 
war, these militias divided Somalis along clan lines and produced an environment within 
Somalia in which the population has been caught between inter-clan wars for over 20 
years. In 2000, this resulted in clan leaders taking a significant role in the peace 
negotiations that took place in Arta, Djibouti.  
There were multiple attempts at peace negotiations between the warring factions 
during the decade’s long civil war in Somalia. However, these negotiations proved to be 
fruitless when warlords, often associated with one of the major Somali clans, acted as 
spoilers if excluded from the process. Under the 2000 peace agreement, the Transitional 
National Government (TNG) established a power-sharing mechanism based on the 
traditional distribution of power among the main clans in Somalia. The TNG created a 
4.5 power sharing formula, which allocated seats in parliament to the four big family 
clans - the Darood, the Dir, the Hawiye, and the Digle-Mirifle, with the remaining .5 
reserved for minority clans and women. Somalia’s first post-conflict government was 
established in 2012 on the basis of this formula.  
The creation of Somalia’s first internationally recognized government in two-
decades was a significant milestone for post-conflict reconstruction. However, Somalia’s 
power sharing formula has also reinforced many of the same divisions and social 
dynamics that played into the civil war. The institutionalization of clans into the 
government through the 4.5 system has strengthened clan identity, which in turn has 
weakened and destabilized the government. The solidifying of clan roles in governance 
has led to a stagnation of Somali politics, in which all aspects of governance are dictated 
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through the lens of clan. This has the potential to lead to more conflict and civil war if 
this system of power sharing persists.  
 
The Project Objective:  
The purpose of this project is to explore the impact of the 4.5 power sharing 
formula on the post-conflict reconstruction process in Somalia. It will examine how the 
clans have retained their influence in the period that began with the culmination of the 
2000 peace agreement through the establishment of the first internationally recognized 
government in 2012. It will also assess whether the absence of the 4.5 formula in the 
2012 constitution signals an intention to limit clan influence in the future. Specifically, 
the project will address the following questions:  
● What role did clan play in the establishment of the 2012 constitution with regards 
to the 4.5 system in Somali politics? 
● How did the 4.5 formula reflect historical patterns of governance in Somalia? 
● What are the implications of the removal of 4.5 system from the 2012 provisional 
constitution in Somali politics? 
 
Project outline:  
The project begins by introducing the origins of the power sharing formula that 
Somalia has used for the past 18 years. Chapter two connects the current 4.5 formula to 
historical dimensions and provides insight on the way clan has functioned in Somalia and 
the xeer social contract system. Furthermore, it covers the ways clans have interacted 
with Somali national governance throughout history, including under colonialism, after 
independence and during the Barre regime. The chapter demonstrates how the clan 
structure was utilized to build political power or acquire personal gain, and how this 
pattern continued through the civil war. It also addresses the 2012 presidency and the 
decision to not include the 4.5 formula for clan based governance in the constitution. 
The project’s third chapter begins with an extensive review of clans and the 
different ways they have been part of Somali society. It also provides an extensive review 
of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) in Somalia, which is needed due to the myriad of 
efforts undertaken to rebuild the government’s capacity. Prior to the 4.5 formula, many 
 3 
 
viewed Somalia as a country led by informal actors and a failed state. For a considerable 
period of time, these informal actors, including clan based warlords were the only form of 
authority. Through analyzing the PCR, I am able to assess if such efforts have succeeded 
and the status of Somalia’s government in its process of rebuilding state capacity.  
The fourth chapter draws on the power sharing and post-conflict reconstruction 
literature to analyze the impact the 4.5 formula on Somali governance, and its absence in 
the 2012 constitution. Specifically, this chapter considers if the power-sharing formula 
has advanced the consolidation of peace and the legitimation of post-conflict governance 
(Ball, 1996).  Finally, the fifth chapter provides a conclusion of the analysis aspect of the 
project and recommendations.
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Chapter Two: Clans and Somali Political Background 
Since independence, Somalia has struggled to reconcile traditional identity with 
modern governance (Lewis, 1972; Samatar and Samatar, 1987; Samatar, 1992; Luling, 
1997; Besteman, 1996). The clan held an important social role prior to the 
implementation of modern governance. For much of Somali history, society was 
organized by clans, whose leadership filled an important role in governance and conflict 
resolution. There is a long track record of clan and government interaction in Somali 
governance. During the colonial period, foreign rulers co-opted clan leaders as a means 
of gaining control of Somali communities. Since colonization, political leaders have 
utilized clan in governance as a tool to gain power and resources. For close to 25 years, 
Somalia has struggled with internal turmoil stemming from a civil war, which began in 
1991. Somalia experienced a shift in 2000 after many attempts to implement governance 
when the Transitional National Government (TNG) was established.  
In order to better understand the significance of clan involvement in Somali 
politics, this chapter will begin by addressing the peace conferences that took place after 
the civil war. In doing so, it will explain how the 4.5 power sharing formula came to be, 
as well as the way in which it has been utilized to elect governments in the past two 
decades. The chapter will then proceed to lay out the Somalia’s larger historical 
background with particular focus on the use of clan by Somali political leadership. This is 
done to give the reader a clear and comprehensive view of clan and governance in Somali 
history.   
 
The 4.5 Peace Agreement  
After the fall of the central government in 1991, peace conferences were held in 
neighboring countries such as Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as well as more distant 
countries like Egypt and Yemen. Already within the first few years of the conflict, a 
conference held in Djibouti in 1991 declared Ali Mahdi, a powerful businessman, the 
new president of Somalia. However, the peace initiative failed due to opposition from 
Mohamed Aidid, a former general and new warlord and the lack of representation from 
other parties to the conflict (Menkhaus, 2007). Elmi (2010:36) noted that warlords were 
considered to be the main stakeholders of Somalia and representatives of clans in all of 
 5 
 
the peace conferences held between 1991 and 1997. The number of warlords claiming to 
represent clans grew after each peace conference. He wrote,  
For example, at the first conference in Djibouti in 1991, six factions 
(representing six clans) were brought together to agree on a power-sharing 
formula. Fifteen clan-based factions participated in the next conference in 
Addis Ababa in 1993. Subsequently, more factions appeared and 28 
factions were invited to the Cairo conference in 1997.  
 
In 2000, peace talks held in Arta, Djibouti produced the Transitional National 
Government (TNG), with Abdiqasim Salad Hassan as president with a parliament of 245 
members. The TNG-produced power sharing policy allocated power based on a 4.5 
formula. The power sharing formula divided parliamentary seats between the four clan 
families of the Dir, Darood, Hawiye, and Digil-Mirifle and a .5 given to the Bantu, 
Benadiri and other minority clans (Menkhaus, 2007). Elmi (2010: 29) noted that in the 
peace talks, the fifth major clan - the Isaaq clan, was put under the Dir clan. He suggested 
that the Isaaq clan viewed this to be “an act of aggression” against them. The TNG 
started to represent Somalia in the international community; however, the government 
collapsed after a year and a half when warlords Hussein Aidid and Musa Sudi led fights 
against it (Le Sage, 2002).   
 In 2004, a conference held by the regional organization of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Kenya produced the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG). The TFG was established with the backing of Ethiopia and the U.S., 
and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed became president with a 275 members of parliament. The 
TFG once again used the 4.5 clan power-sharing system to elect the new government and 
its officials. The total number of seats were divided by 4.5, resulting in approximately 62 
seats in parliament per major clan and 31 seats for minority clan groups (Elmi, 2010). It 
is worth noting that the number of seats in the parliament has fluctuated over time in 
different elections. The reasoning behind this is still unknown, but one consistent factor is 
the allocation of parliamentary seats using the overarching 4.5 formula. Elmi (2010) 
suggested the peace process had issues due to the interference of external actors, such as 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Libya. As a result of their involvement in the peace talks, these 
states became backers for certain clan actors in the conflict. The TFG experienced 
problems stemming from their lack of legitimacy and warlords fighting against them. 
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These issues led to the inability if the TFG to take control of the Somalia. In 2009, the 4.5 
formula procedure was used once again to elect President Sheik Shariff Sheikh Ahmed 
for the TGF 2.0.  
 
Power Sharing’s Social Origins 
 The majority of Somalia’s 11 million people are divided among five major clan 
families: The Hawiye, the Darood, the Dir, the Isaaq, and finally the Digil and Mirifle 
(Lewis, 1993). Tradition holds that these five families can be traced back to a mythical 
figure called Hiil and his sons Sab and Samaale (Mansur, 1995). The Hawiye, Daarood, 
Dir, and Isaaq clans are considered to be descendants of Samaale, while the Digil and 
Mirifle are considered to be descendants of Sab. This is important because it confirms the 
way Emli and Barise (2006), Emli (2010), and Leonard and Samatar (2011) have 
discussed clan fluidity in Somalia. Emli (2010) noted that in Somalia, sub-clans which 
are affiliated with one another do not have solid connection linking them. Beyond these 
five families, there are also two minority groupings; the minority clans and an additional 
group perceived as ethnically different (Kusow and Eno, 2015). The minority clans are 
the Gabooye, the Tumaal, the Yibir, and the Midgaan. They are the descendants of the 
occupational caste formed by hunters, blacksmiths, and ritual specialists. The ethnically 
different groups are made of up of the Somali Bantu and the Banadiri Reer Hamar.  
While these tribal identities are fluid, there are clear differences in dialect across 
the different tribal areas. For example, southern Somalis primarily speak the “Maai” 
dialect, while northern-central Somalis speak the “Mahaatiri” dialect (Mukhatar, 1988). 
However, there are also many commonalities, such as the xeer social system which 
Somalis have used to organize and regulate themselves before the establishment of 
modern governance. This will be further elaborated on in the clan section below.  
 However, despite the importance of the clans in Somali society, most western 
scholarship has treated Somalis as a homogenous group of pastoral nomads. The work of 
Lewis (1955) typifies this perspective. His work was carried out in the British colony of 
northern Somalia, now known as Somaliland. Although within Somali studies, Lewis is 
considered to be a renowned ethnographer for his work on Somali history and culture, he 
has been criticized by both Somali and foreign scholars (Samatar, 1997; Besteman, 1995) 
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for perpetuating a monolithic idea of Somalis.1 Mukhtar (1995) noted the efforts made by 
the government in the 1960s and 1970s to glorify the traditions of nomadic communities. 
He wrote, “... ‘The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education’, from which the Somali 
Academy of Culture eventually emerged as the custodian of the invented Somali 
tradition, which glorified the nomadic tradition but also ignored and degraded other 
Somali traditions” (Mukhtar, 1995: 21).  
Besteman (1995) refutes this narrative outlining the distinct differences in 
livelihood and culture between Somalis that reside in the north versus those of the 
south.  She argues, “...the perception of a homogenous populations of cattle-and-camels 
herders in historically incorrect because it exclude the significant number of farmers who 
have lived along the banks of Somalia’s two major rivers, the Jubba and the Shebelle, for 
generations” (Besteman, 1995: 43). Her work in particular refers to the social division 
within Somalia created by perceived ethnic differences between Bantu Somalis and the 
majority of Somalis. Bantu Somalis have been considered as the ‘other’ within Somalia 
due to their distinct ‘physical characteristics’ despite speaking Somali, and practicing the 
same culture and religion (Besteman, 1995). This negative connotation comes from the 
history of slavery in Somalia, and Bantus are viewed as descendants of said slaves. For 
the purposes of this study, I will focus mainly on Somali Bantus as they are the most 
prominent of the minority groupings in the literature and face discrimination based on 
their ethnicity and their appearance, despite possibly being natives of the land.  
 
Importance of Clan within Somali Society  
This aspect of the chapter looks at Somalis’ high regard for clan. Mukhtar (1995) 
describes the importance of clan in northern nomadic communities, which can be traced 
back to the significance of livestock to the livelihoods of the clans that reside there. The 
xeer social contract within the clan dynamics has determined the way one conducts 
themselves in the community and was more important to the lives of nomads then to the 
southern farmer communities (Mukhtar, 1995). Traditionally, livestock has been very 
 
1 Lewis’s work is popularly termed as  “Cadaan Studies” which literally translates to 
white studies. This generally refers to the strong presence of European scholars within 
Somali studies and the negative perceptions of Somalis that have stemmed from this.  
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important in the nomadic lifestyle, in particular camels have served as both nourishment 
and revenue. Mansur (1995) and Mukhtar (2003) noted the importance of camels and 
their roles in a pastoral nomadic life. Mansur (1995) addressed it through the role camels 
have played in terms of revenue and restitution for criminal cases and said, “Thanks to 
their high social and economic, the payment of camels for murder often resolves bad 
blood existing between communities and individuals” (108). Adam (1999) noted that clan 
identity becomes more salient in times of crisis, such as in times of war or a natural 
disaster. 
Leonard and Samatar (2011) pointed to the loose nature of clan, at times saying 
that clan identity in many ways is a constructed in each society. Musau (2013:15) wrote,  
“Despite the prevailing political realities, all Somalis are allowed, especially in 
time of war or famine, to move in and live anywhere in the Somali geography. 
This means a Hawiye clansman fleeing a civil war in Mogadishu is welcome in a 
Darod dominated territory, thus implying that the Somali identity takes primacy 
over clan lineage or kinship system”.  
 
Despite of this loose nature, minority groups like Somali Bantus have increasingly 
experienced discrimination due to the prevalence of clan affiliation in the general Somali 
society as Besteman (1995) addressed.  
 
Clan Relationship (Tol/Kinship)   
This section covers the way kinship and the xeer system function. Adam (1999) 
likened clans to other forms of identities that exist in different societies, such as tribes 
and ethnicities. Jama (2007) further explained this and suggested that the term tribe in the 
context of Somalia is out of place because, “‘tribe’ meant small, centralized or a 
cephalous groups, each with unique characteristics such as territorial boundaries, distinct 
origin and language”(226). Somalis, on the other hand, differentiate one another based on 
lineage and blood relation and therefore the term clan fits better. Somalis identify 
themselves and one another through a series of a clan breakdown, starting from the big 
family clans: Hawiye, the Darood, the Dir, the Isaaq, and the Digle-Mirfle and breaks 
down to sub-clan, sub-sub clans, the dia-paying group, and the family or household unit. 
 
Xeer (Social Contract)  
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Moving away from kinship, another significant aspect in the way Somalis 
interacted with one another is the xeer social contract system. Jama (2007:226) noted 
“The kinship system is based on blood relation, but the ties that bind blood relatives are 
grounded on social contract-on a public system of rule publicly negotiated.” Somalis 
have used xeer as a way to deal with all aspects of clan life. It was also functioned as a 
judicial system which did not have a central authority, but instead adult males within 
each community carried out judgments. Gundel (2006) noted that the xeer system is 
constantly changing and agreements can be adjusted or abandoned and new contracts 
made if a situation called for it.  Jama (2007) noted the presence of important judicial 
branches like the “shir (Political Council) and xeerbeegti (Law Council)” (227). The law 
council dealt with the legal issues and practiced “a veil of ignorance” in order to 
avoid bias in their rulings of legal and societal nature. It also had its own judicial system, 
which is quite similar to what is seen in court proceedings all over the world. Roles like 
plaintiffs, defendants, court recorders and lawyers with a potential backing from an 
assistant lawyer were all present in these legal proceedings. The xeer system is still 
strong, particularly in rural parts of Somalia and has also been used in urban settings by 
businesses and regular folk to settle disputes (Gundel, 2006). 
Gundel (2006) noted that the xeer system was male-centric due to clan elders (any 
adult male) being the authorities that led decision making within the judicial proceedings 
of the xeer. Jama (2007: 227) discussed the way one become a leader within the clan and 
wrote, “Leadership (riyasa) was based on the voluntary loyalty of people to certain men 
because they admired certain qualities about them; such leaders, however, had no 
coercion (qahr) to exact loyalty”. He suggested since all men were equal in society, 
leadership could be acquired through one’s wealth, poetic skills, knowledge among other 
things. 
 Both Gundel (2006) and Jama (2007) have discussed the importance of the dia-
paying group in relation to xeer system. Jama (2007) posited that the dia-paying is the 
most important in clan lineage as it is where responsibility is shared. The dia-paying 
groups come from the breakdown of clan families, going from sub-clans, sub-sub clans, 
dia-paying groups, until finally the family unit. The dia-paying groups are essentially 
made up of adult males in the clan and come together to make decisions for the 
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community in all aspects of life. The dia-paying group took on many responsibilities, 
ranging from dealing with cases of theft, murder to establishing new dia-paying groups, 
starting war, and concluding peace agreements. Gundel (2006) noted the strength of a 
dia-paying group relies on the wealth of the members and the willingness to use personal 
funds to aid those in the group.  He also addressed the importance of the family unit for 
Somalis, which determines responsibilities of each member and serves as a safety net for 
those who are not able to care for themselves like the children, the disabled, and the 
elderly.  
 
Colonization   
This part of the chapter covers the impact of colonialism on clan and the social 
structures that were created. Colonial rule in Somalia affected Somalis in different ways 
depending on location. Those that resided in south and in the farming areas felt the most 
impact from colonial consequences versus those in the northern parts of the country, 
which were still ruled by clan elders. Prunier (1996: 39) noted the different ways Somalis 
were impacted by the colonizers. He wrote,  
“The British administration in the North, which had barely imposed itself on its 
Somali subjects and had for the most part left the traditional customs of xeer 
untouched, and the Italian fascist colonial rule in the south whose extremely 
authoritarian philosophy had led to the nearly complete destruction of indigenous 
forms of political and social control”  
 
Besteman (1995) wrote that colonization contributed to the issue of inequality within 
Somalia’s social order. The group, which was most heavily subjugated during colonial 
rule, was the Somali Bantu, particularly within the plantation system implemented by the 
Italians. The British referred to northern Somalis as the ‘natives’ of Somalia and elevated 
that identity. The Italian used the word ‘liberti’ for Somali Bantus in order to connect 
them back to their slave roots and make them distinct. In employing this distinction as a 
tactic, they succeeded in getting the labor for their plantations.  
 Njoku (2013) discussed Sir Donald Cameron’s advice to the British that they 
should built on the already existing traditional system in Somalia. Jama (2007) added to 
this and addressed the creation of hierarchy within clan communities. As previously 
discussed, prior to colonization, hierarchy of leadership did not exist, and the role of 
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leadership could be taken on by any adult male in the community. However, colonial 
powers began to allocate new authority to leaders (aqkils), and this in turn weakened 
traditional systems and incited jealousy among the clan. Colonial officers and their 
attempts to implement the same system of control as they had in other parts of Africa 
came to naught. This was due to their inability to separate clans for easier control of 
Somalia since they had lived amongst one another and inter-married (Jama, 2007).  
 
Resistance to Colonialism  
Somalis began to resist colonialism in 1899, when Sayyid Mohammed Abdulle 
Hassan known as the ‘Mad Mullah’ started the fight for an independent Somalia and 
reunification of all Somalis. This movement was called “Dervish Movement,” which 
began in northern part of the country and lasted until 1920 (Sheikh-Abdi, 1977). Hassan 
used his poetry to unite Somali clans in order to fight their colonial rulers. Hassan was 
effective in battle to the point in which the British and Ethiopians joined forces in order 
to fight him (Hess, 1964). In the south, resistance came in the form of battling against 
forced labor and slavery. This movement, which was called the “Gosha Revolt” and led 
by Nassib Buunto, lasted from 1890 to 1907 and was against both the colonizers and the 
Somali overseers that worked for them (Mukhtar, 1996). The forced labor of the southern 
Somalis led large-scale deaths from forced work and disease.  
 
Post-colonial Somalia and the First Republic  
This subsection of the chapter addresses the preparation for an independent 
Somalia and the beginning of clan politicization by Somali leadership. After the Second 
World War, and with the end of Italian colonization in 1941, Somalia’s political growth 
started to take place (Abbink, 2001). The defeat of Italy in the war led to Somali 
territories coming under the rule of the British Mandate. Samatar and Samatar (1987) 
posit that the end of World War II prompted advocacy for self-determination and 
democracy. In Somalia, this led to the creation of a local Somali political party in 1945 
called the Somali Youth League (SYL). The SYL consisted of former British employees. 
Barnes (2007:277) discussed the origins of SYL and wrote,  
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“From 1946 to 1948 the Somali Youth Club (SYC) grew from a small 
Mogadishu based urban self-help organization into a burgeoning 
nationalist organisation calling for the unification of all the Somali-
speaking lands into Greater Somalia, changing its name to the ‘Somali 
Youth League’ (SYL) in the process”  
 
The SYL used Hassan’s (Mad Mullah) rhetoric which had advocated for the unification 
of Somali clans under Somali rule. The SYL began to promote education and social 
institutional building while also campaigning against clan division among Somalis 
(Barnes, 2007). This eventually led to gaining independence for Somalia on July 1st in 
1960 (Sheikh-Abdi, 1977).  
 From 1950 to 1960, Somalia fell under Italian Trusteeship, known in Italian as 
Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (AFIS), which was a UN-sanctioned 
program established by Resolution 289. The AFIS was meant to aid Somalia in building a 
modern state with democratic governance. In an attempt to build future leadership in 
Somalia, the AFIS sent Somali youth, mostly coming from the SYL, to Italy for a period 
of three years to take courses in subjects such as  “administration, law, history of 
civilization, Islam, international law, UN organization, economy, geography, and the 
international statute for the organization of Somalia” (Tripodi, 1999: 368).   
Ware (1965) discussed Somali political party expansion in the period of the 
trusteeship and named two additional significant parties involved. These parties were the 
Hisbia Dighil Mirifle (HDM) which represented the inter-river region in south and 
Partito Democratico Somalo, which was established by integrating multiple parties. 
Between 1950 and 1954, Somalia experienced a growth in the number of individuals’ 
involved in politics from 38,567 to 62,509. Mukhtar (1988) discussed many issues that 
became prevalent during the AFIS, such as the violence between Somali political parties 
that was connected to a north versus south rhetoric. The SYL were viewed to be heavily 
supported by the British and representing nomadic clans, and the HDM in the south 
viewed the presence of nomadic clans as representation of northern interests and feared 
the economic repercussions this carried.  
In March of 1954, the first municipal election took place in Somalia as an 
experiment to observe the way Somalis would behave in modern state elections. There 
was a registration process in many parts of the country before the elections which 
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registered 50,000 individuals. Those that participated in the voting were all male. There 
were 281 seats in the competition for governance; the SYL won 140 of the seats and 
HDMS party came in second with 57 seats (Mukhtar, 1988).  
Samatar and Samatar (1987: 679) noted the condition Somali was in before the 
independence was formerly declared and wrote  
“On the eve of independence, the emerging post-colonial state in Somalia 
was marked, inter alia, by (1) competition for lucrative jobs in the public 
bureaucracy by element of the petite-bourgeoisie, the main supporters of 
the S.Y.L.; (2) economic foundations afflicted with a large and neglected 
subsistence sector, yet articulated to international and regional markets; 
(3) peasant productivity hobbled by usurious credit practice of middle 
traders; and (4) exceedingly poor infrastructures, chronic balance-of-
payments deficits, and acute dependence on foreign beneficence to 
assuage annual deficits”. 
 
According to this assessment the conditions in Somalia at the start of the first 
independent government were already dire. Tripodi (1999) explains the country’s 
challenges occurred as a result of Italy’s inability to invest sufficient resources in 
Somalia. The Italians were experiencing financial troubles at the beginning of the AFIS 
and had difficulties sustaining the number of troops needed. The AFIS also failed in their 
attempts to establish an economy due to these financial constraints.  
 
The First Republic  
 This section of the chapter addresses the first government and the use of clan by 
those in the parliament for personal gain and political power. In 1958, elections based on 
universal suffrage, which allowed women to take part in the government, took place 
(Tripodi, 1999). In 1960, the British and Italian colonial territories of Somalia were 
united to become the new state of Somalia. Aden Abdullah Osman became the first 
president of country, with Ali Sharmarke as the Prime Minister in a democratic 
parliamentary system. Both Lewis (1972) and Njoku (2013) pointed to the hastiness of 
the union between the two territories and the subsequent issues which stemmed from it. 
Lewis (1972) noted the imbalance of power with Mogadishu being the center for business 
and the country’s capital. He also noted that within the first two years of the country’s 
existence, the northern part of the country felt disconnected and dissatisfied with the 
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southern-ruled government. Njoku (2013) built on this and pointed out that the politicians 
in the south presented requirements to the north, which would guarantee both the 
president and prime minister come from the south.  
The Somali government took up the cause of “Greater Somalia” or “Somali-
Weyn” as its first order of business. This meant uniting all Somali territories of French 
Somalia (Djibouti), Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, and the Ogaden region in 
Ethiopia. The cause was first brought at the Conference in Cairo in 1961, as well as in 
front of the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and the United 
Nations. The efforts however did not produce any substantial progress due to the interest 
of keeping already established international sovereign borders (Sheikh-Abdi, 1977).   
The new state faced many issues at the beginning of its independence in terms of 
attempted colonial influence in government and clan use in politics. Mukhtar (1989) 
noted that the Italians wanted political influence during their exit from Somalia, and they 
tried to gain it through replacing Italian staff with Somalis from their colonial territory. 
Samatar and Samatar (1987) noted colonial influence through the government’s 
dependence on external revenue from former colonial powers for the country's finances. 
This external revenue was misappropriated by the parliamentarians as personal resources 
and power, which eventually led to political parties growing from 24 in 1964 to 62 by 
1969. Samatar and Samatar (1987: 683) also noted that  
“Given the lack of substantive ideological differences between the contestants 
regarding strategies of accumulation, other pre-capitalist belief system, such as 
clanship, were resurrected to distinguish between the parliamentary candidates, as 
evidenced by the proliferation of political parties in the 1960s”. 
 
Lewis (1988) built on this and posited that despite a modern independent state, Somalis 
to a large extent still dealt in clan loyalty in politics. Mukhtar (1989) pointed to this 
problem in the elections of 1956 and 1958, in which clan had also been utilized as a way 
to gain power in governance.  
Samatar and Samatar (1987: 681-682) suggested, “In the end, the contest over 
parliamentary seats in the First Republic (1960-4) was not about the future developmental 
orientation of Somalia; rather, it was a race to see who could control the central organs of 
the state and, consequently, its resources”. Adowa (2013) added to this and discussed the 
purchasing of votes in order to secure parliamentary seats in the struggle for political 
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control. He says this created a pattern that Somali politicians still practice today, as well 
as an image of corruption that has also stayed persistent.   
In 1964 for the first time parliamentary general elections were held, and the clan 
alliances formed in the previous years of governance were put to the test. Lewis (1972) 
noted that 21 political parties contested the elections. Despite of this, the election 
continued and the SYL won 69 out of 123 seats for parliament. The new government 
seemed to be balanced with politicians from both the south and north holding ministry 
positions. However, the new government resigned in 1966 after dealing issues such as 
politicians reneging on their promised support if they found it did not suit them or were 
encouraged to do otherwise.  
On June 10th, 1967, the second presidential elections were held with Abdirashid 
Ali Sharmarke becoming the second president of the country. Samatar and Samatar 
(2008: 6) wrote, “That election was the first and only national occasion in which 
leadership, democracy, and the autonomy of public service were at the center of the 
contest.” However by October, Said Yusuf Ismail, a soldier from a rival sub-clan of 
Sharmake’s own larger clan, assassinated President Sharmarke in Laas Aanood. This led 
to General Mohamed Siad Barre taking control of the government with his armed forces 
(Ingiriis, 2017).  
 
Siad Barre’s Regime 
       Under Barre’s regime, Somalia again saw clans being used as a tool to seize and hold 
power. In particular, the use of public funds for the Ogaden war by the Barre regime 
further exacerbated political division along clan lines (Samatar and Samatar, 1987). 
Following Barre’s coup, political parties were dismantled and declared illegal and 
replaced by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) (Lewis, 1972). In addition to 
adopting Marxist socialism as the official form of governance, the SRC also attempted to 
eradicate the use of clan affiliation as a political platform. Davidson (1975: 28) wrote 
“Early in 1971 the regime proceeded to nationalize banks, insurance companies, and 
various other concerns with foreign money in them…” Abdi-Sheikh (1977) noted Barre’s 
government attempted nation building in all aspects of Somalia, such as creating a written 
form of the Somali language, literacy campaigns, and healthcare throughout the country.  
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 The regime soon refurbished the first republic’s interest in “Somali-weyn” after a 
few years of ruling by going to war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region in 1977. The 
war ended in defeat by 1978. Adoda (1985) noted Somalia’s defeat to Ethiopia was due 
to the Soviets decision to back Ethiopia rather than Somalia, which led to severance of 
the two countries relations. Weiss (1980) discussed Barre’s shift in allegiance to the West 
after this defeat and the new military aid the United State agreed to provide. The US 
viewed this as an opportunity to balance power in the region through the Cold War 
paradigm. By the 1980s, 60% of the state’s revenue came from foreign humanitarian and 
development aid (Loubser and Solomon, 2014).   
Adam (1992:17) wrote, “From 1978-1980 onwards, Siyaad began actively to 
poison clan relations, instigating conflicts indirectly, providing arms and funds to 
protagonist and then publicly dispatching his cabinet ministers to mediate such conflicts”. 
He also addressed Barre’s hindrance of petty bourgeois development in Somalia and in 
doing so valued the idea of “state clan” more. This meant that he gave power to his 
Darood family clan. Prunier (1996) discussed this further in the alliance Barre created 
between three Darood sub-clans to keep control of the country. They were the Maheran 
clan of his father, the Ogaden clan of his mother and the Dolbahante clan of his son-in-
law, generally referred to as the MOD. Besteman (1996) discussed the vulnerability of 
Bantu Somalis during this time, when their lands were being confiscated for 
governmental use as well as rewards for Barre’s allies. Luling (1997:290) wrote  
“All public use of clan names was forbidden; yet all the while Siyad Barre 
was practicing ‘clan clientelism’, distributing arms and money to his 
friends, ‘encouraging them to attack the common clan enemies who, of 
course, were accused of divisive ‘tribalism’ by the master tribalist…by 
destroying his country’s economy, Siyad also directly promoted those 
conditions of general lack of resources and insecurity on which clan 
loyalty thrives, since clan solidarity offers the only hope for survival”. 
 
Adowa (2013) suggested Barra’s obsession with making his clan the ruling elite led to 
more fractions and eventually to the civil war that Somalia has experienced for the past 
two decades.    
When scholars (Besteman, 1996; Samatar, 1997; Elmi and Barise, 2006; Ahmed 
and Green, 2011; Odawa, 2013; Ingiriis, 2016) have write about this period of Somali 
politics, they point to Barre’s use of collective punishment to those that opposed him. 
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Besteman (1996) noted Barre’s collective punishment against whole clans for the 
transgressions of a few members. Elmi and Barise (2006) add to this and discuss the 
aftermath of the Ogaden war in 1978. There were talks of potential change in government 
by political members from the north and an attempted coup, which led to Barre using 
extreme measures of punishment. Samatar (1997:703) wrote, “The collective punishment 
of the people in the region included destruction and poisoning of the nomadic water 
wells, killing of livestock and the dismissal or imprisonment of any prominent person 
from the region of who was suspected of being sympathetic to the coup”.  
In addition to these punishments, Barre also bombed of the city of Hargeisa in the 
late 1980s, which led to the loss of many lives, internal displacement, and infrastructure 
destruction (Samatar, 1997). Ahmed and Green (1999) estimated that around 100,000 
Somalis lost their lives in attacks carried out against Hargeisa. Odawa (2013:22) 
suggested that Barre used KGB-like tactics against his enemies and essentially turned the 
“the country into one large open prison camp.” Ingiriis (2016) likened the events that 
took place in Hargeisa to a scale of genocide due to Barre’s intentions of eradicating the 
members of the Isaaq clan for the sole purpose of their clan genealogy. Barre’s use of 
clan and excessive punishment against those not aligned with him, along with economic 
difficulties from the U.S. cutting aid to the regime, led to Somalia’s civil war in 1991.  
 
Civil War and the Collapse of the Somali State 
Barre’s practices solidified the divisions between Somali clans, which continued 
into the civil war. Adam (1999) noted that the civil war affected Somalis differently in 
the sense of those that were being targeted based on clan (the Darood) or their lack of 
clan (Bantu), the latter being ‘massacred’ by Barre’s forces. Samatar (1997: 625) referred 
to the civil war period as “ ‘Dad Cunkii’- the era of cannibalism. He referred to it as the 
era of cannibalism due to the large scale of deaths during which close to half of the 
population was in danger of perishing.  
Revolutionary elements had been present in country since the 1980s with the 
presence of military factions in the north. In 1981, members of the Isaaq clan in the 
British diaspora created the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM was a guerilla 
militia group which fought from Ethiopian territory along the already existing Somali 
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Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) of the Majeerteen clan in an attempt to overthrow the 
Barre dictatorship (Prunier, 1996). Other groups like the Somali Patriotic Movement 
(SPM) of the Ogaden clan and the United Somali Congress (USC) of the Hawiye clans 
were also created in the fight against Barre (Luling, 1997). 
In the aftermath of the successful ousting of Barre, faction leaders began vying for 
control of the state; however, they were unable to achieve a decisive victory against one 
another, leading to a series of small civil wars along clan lines (Adam, 1999). Samatar 
(1997) argues that this stemmed from the assumptions of each faction leader that they 
would be the one to replace Barre after the war. He noted that the clan militias created 
during the fight against Barre became harder to control and started to break into sub-clan 
and sub-sub clan based militias. With their new gained powers, the “mooryaans” (young 
men fighting in the war) began to loot, steal, rape and destroy throughout Somalia. They 
eventually became warlords that claimed certain parts of Somalia as their clans’ “‘native 
area’”. 
In the 1990’s, humanitarian intervention from organizations like the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) started to take place alongside reconstruction and peacebuilding 
efforts. However, these attempts by the international community were not successful. 
Adam (1999) suggested that more than half the population of Somalia 4.5 million out of 8 
to 10 million were starving and needed urgent help. Ahmed and Green (1999) noted that 
an estimated 3 to 5 hundred thousand individuals died during the famine and related 
problems like infectious diseases.  
Menkhaus (2010) noted the arrival of a large number of NGOs during the famine 
period in the first few years of war. They began to be targeted by clan militias for their 
aid. Despite of this, they employed militias as a security in order to carry out 
humanitarian programs and paid them under the guise of ‘technical support.’ However 
this protection did not necessarily translate to security in the whole country, rather 
because clans changed from territory to territory, it meant that the aid they carried could 
still be taken. The payment acquired from NGOs by these clan militias was used as a new 
source of revenue and power by the militias. Ahmed and Green (1999) suggested that the 
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large number of NGOs with their competing agendas ended up complicating the issue 
further. 
 In 1992, the United Nations and United States became involved in the conflict and 
began a military humanitarian intervention called Operation Restore Hope (ORH). The 
Operation included many countries like Pakistan, Canada, Belgium, France, Italy and 
Germany. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which began June in 1991 and 
lasted until February 1992, was a small-scale operation with the intent of aiding 
humanitarian groups and establishing a cease-fire in the civil war. The United Task Force 
(UNITAF) which took effect late 1992 and ended mid 1993 was authorized under the 
Security Council Resolution 794; it involved a US-led force with the goal of establishing 
a secure Somalia and in doing so would be allowed to use deadly force if a situation 
called for it (Patman, 1997). Menkhaus (2010) noted that UNITAF disallowed Somalis to 
carry weapons in public and brought some stability, and as a result NGOs began to 
operate more smoothly after this.  
The second phase of the operation (UNOSOM II) began in 1993 with the 
dissolution of the U.S. lead UNITAF (Diehl, 1995). The operation turned into a manhunt 
for Mohamed Aidid, (a former general, political prisoner of the Barre regime, and faction 
leader and warlord in the civil war) with some success in capturing his allies. However, 
Somalis eventually started to resent UN presence and riots broke out in Somalia. Diehl 
(1995) noted that 24 Pakistani UN troops were killed and 54 injured in 1993, a few weeks 
later the UNSOM II forces fired at and ended up killing 20 civilians. This prompted a SC 
investigation, which determined that Aidid and his followers instigated these riots. Adam 
(1999) suggested that although UN presence in Somalia brought much needed security 
for a short time, in the end fighting continued with UNOSOM II coming to be viewed as 
part of the conflict. In October of 1993, a U.S. helicopter was shot down, killing 
American soldiers, which prompted President Bill Clinton to withdraw from Somalia.  
 In 1993, the UN started to embark on conflict resolution conferences, which 
involved faction leaders; however, despite signing on to agreements multiple times, each 
of these agreements ended up in failure (Ahmed and Green, 1999). Conferences were 
held in countries like Egypt, Yemen, as well as in neighboring states like Kenya, Djibouti 
and Ethiopia however. Ahmed and Green (1999: 124) argued “A major problem with 
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these high profile affairs is that legitimate representative of the affected communities, 
such as elder, merchants, women’s groups and other genuine stakeholders, are not 
included.” Adam (1999: 186) posited that external interventions in Somalia with the goal 
of conflict resolution were ineffective and that “...some Somalis argue even that outside 
forces exacerbated matters, thereby delaying, if not reducing the chances of, peaceful 
settlement.”  
Somaliland, led by the SNM, proclaimed independence 1991, and the region of 
Puntland followed suit in 1998. Johnson and Smaker (2014) discussed the different ways 
the de-facto states of Somaliland and Puntland developed and role clans played. In 
Somaliland, the first seven years of declared independence consisted of clans inter 
fighting one another. It became clear that clan elders were needed and stepped in to 
negotiate for a power-sharing mechanism between the Isaaq sub-clans of the Warsangeli 
and the Dulbanantee as well the Dir sub-clans of the Gadabuursi and the Ciise. In the 
state of Puntland, the majority of population is from the Majerten sub-clan of the Darod 
family clan. They were all attempting self-governance despite the refusal of recognition 
from the African Union and the United Nations (Njoku, 2013). 
 In southern-central Somalia, the multiple negotiation processes discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter took place. Through these negotiations, clans agreed on the 
power-sharing mechanism which has led to the limited stability Somalia has experienced 
in the past two decades. Agreeing to a formula that distributed power among the four 
major clans remaining in the region was essential to stopping the conflict. The 
distribution of power among these clans reflects the long history of clan significance to 
Somali politics. The equal division of power in parliament signaled to a move away from 
the practices of Barre’s regime, during which he attempted to privilege his clan over 
others. This led to an environment where clans were comfortable with the governance of 
the state. It is important to note that this power-sharing mechanism was only the first step 
to achieving stability in the country. Successful post-conflict reconstruction will require 
the establishment of an effective government which overcomes the initial underlying 
issues that led to the civil war to begin with. The current state of Somali governance 
presents a risk which can lead to the same politicization of clan that has been observed 
throughout Somali political history. The Somali government has yet to put in place 
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checks and balances in both the distribution of governance and resources to ensure that 
clans are not once again politicized to gain such access. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 In order to answer the questions at hand, there needs to be an extensive review of 
the literature in the different ways clan has been present in Somali society and politics. 
The review begins with how clan has interacted with Somali leadership and conflict. The 
second part of the literature review consists of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and the 
way it is carried out in failed states. Finally, it also covers PCR and power-sharing 
mechanisms as a way to implement peace in conflict situations such as Somalia. 
 
Clan in Governance: Leadership and Legitimacy  
This section of the literature addressed the role clan took in Somali governance 
and how it has changed throughout political history. From independence and onwards, 
the leadership in government as well as warlords in the civil war era have utilized clan as 
a way to gain access to power and resources. Scholars (Samatar and Samatar, 1987; 
Tulumello, 1993; Luling, 1997; Elmi, 2010) have discussed leadership in Somalia and 
their utilization of clan as a dividing tool as well as a uniting force at times of war. 
Samatar and Samatar (1987) addressed the Somali governance in the 1960s and the way 
in which the newly elected parliamentary leadership realized the need for clan backing in 
the absence of ideological differences between political parties. This eventually led to an 
explosion of political parties with each their own clan affiliation.  
Tulumello (1993) addressed clan as a tool in the civil war era and said that the 
clan resistance groups were created to fight against Siad Barre’s military regime. After 
his ousting, clan lines became further divided for power grabbing purposes. Luling 
(1997) posited that the tendency to look at clan as ‘irrational’ thing from the past could 
not be further from the truth, and those that use clan are “rational” and aware of its power 
for personal gain. Elmi (2010: 44) has noted that both colonial leaders and Somali 
politicians have marginalized traditional leaders. This has led to political leaders 
becoming the “de-facto clan leaders”.  
Scholars (Adam, 1992; Samatar and Samatar, 1987; Tripodi, 1999; Leonard and 
Samatar, 2011; Odawa, 2013; Menkhaus, 2014) have discussed the use of clan by 
different types of leaders in Somalia including politicians, businessmen and warlords. 
Tripodi (1999) noted the presence of clannism in Somali politics before the establishment 
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of the first government and clan use by the leaders in forming groups based on potential 
personal gain. Both Samatar and Samatar (1987) and Menkhaus (2014) have noted the 
use of public funds as a way to buy power in Somalia. Samatar and Samatar (1987) 
addressed the parliament in the civil government during the 1960s and their use of public 
funds to gain political power. Adam (1992) discussed Barre and his poisoning of clan 
relationships as a tactic to divide the opposition groups forming against him.  
 Gundel (2006) and Leonard and Samatar (2011) have discussed the re-emergence 
of traditional leaders in the civil war. Gundel (2006: iv) argues,  
“Since the civil war in 1990 the traditional authorities have regained considerable 
importance, especially in creating peace, security and law and order after the state 
collapse. Their primary role is still the regulation of access to shared resources 
such as grazing areas and water”. 
 
He suggested that the legitimacy of the traditional authorities lies outside the modern 
ways of establishing legitimacy through elections and stems from their history in Somalia 
unlike the politicians, which have controlled the government since independence. 
Leonard and Samatar (2011) suggested that the xeer system is at odds with modern 
governance, however, after the state collapsed, it proved to be a fair judicial authority for 
Somalis. They say that the xeer system put checks in place so there was space for 
negotiation through the dia-paying groups between clans before resorting to revenge. 
Leonard and Samatar (2011) have pointed to the use of clan by warlords and 
businessmen as it became apparent that clan backing was a way to gain access power in 
Somali society during and after the period of the civil war. They wrote, “Politics within 
the Somali political systems is heavily influenced by those individuals who are able to 
use their resources to purchase protection, personal consideration, elected offices and 
policy attention” (572). They have also noted the presence of former warlords within 
current Somali governments like the Transitional Federal Government. Odawa (2013) 
posited that the use of clan by leadership hinders the progress of effectively establishing 
governance outside of clan. Menkhaus (2014) referred the use of donor funds in the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the widespread corruption that was present. 
 
Clan and Conflict 
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This part of the literature looks at the relationship between clan and conflict. This 
relationship had always been present Somali society however, during the Barre regime, 
which came into power in 1969 and ended in 1991, it became more salient. In turn, the 
civil war exacerbated this as militias were divided by clan, which will be explained 
further next.  
Adam (1992) discussed the formation of an alliance between three Darood sub-
clans (Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante) during the ruling of Barre and how in doing so 
he created members of an in-group, which aided him in instigating violence in the 
country. Samatar (1997) and Ahmed and Green (1999) added to this by noting Barre’s 
violence against the members of the Isaaq clan in Hargeisa as a result of certain members 
attempting a coup against him. In the aftermath of the fight against Barre’s regime, 
leaders of the opposition faction started to separate along clan lines. As a result these 
newly formed groups began fighting one another, which led to increased fragmentation of 
clan militias. Samatar (1997) noted the ways in which these militias began to enact 
violence through looting and raping civilian women from opposing clans..   
On the other hand, Scholars (Gundel, 2006; Leonard and Samatar, 2011; Musau, 
2013) have discussed the positive role clan took on during the civil war. Gundel (2006) 
noted that with the collapse of Barre’s government, clans served as safe havens for 
Somalis and became the authority of their respective communities. Leonard and Samatar 
(2011) wrote that “in Somalia the reach of the state was never complete and governance 
institutions that pre-existed it have continued to persist or have been resurrected in the 
years since 1991” (561). Reiterating Gundel (2006), throughout differing political 
regimes, clan identity and affiliation was always present. Further, during the civil war and 
despite attempts of the state to eliminate clan influence, clan affiliation reemerged. In a 
similar vein, Musau (2013) discussed the positive influence of clan and its relationship 
with “Somalinimo” (Somali nationalism) and said that clans do not exceed humanity 
within the Somali community at times of war. 
Abbink (2003) has suggested that while violence is not the direct result of clans, it 
is the organization of clans and the way they have been utilized in the general society, 
which has indirectly brought conflict forward. Elmi and Barise (2006) build on this and 
posit that clan on its own does not produce violence but rather it is the way in which 
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those in power have utilized it as a violent tool. Leonard and Samatar (2011) suggested 
that clans have been resurrected during the civil war because they served as stabilizing 
agents and at times an organizational tool for violent actors.  
 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction  
 Leonard and Samatar’s conclusions regarding the purpose of re-incorporating the 
clans in post conflict governance is supported in much of the academic literature on post- 
conflict reconstruction. In his Agenda for Peace in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
established a framework for post-conflict peace-building stating,  “the efforts of the 
Organization to build peace, stability, security, must encompass matters beyond military 
threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past” 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This can be applied to Somalia because warlords used clan to 
divide Somalis along lines and in the process gained new power. In order to apply this to 
the situation in Somalia, ending conflict on its own does not address the problem. As 
Boutros-Ghali suggests, underlying issues such as the politicizing of clan, need to be 
addressed in an effort to build a sustainable government.  
 
PCR Definition 
The literature produced by many contemporary scholars (Paris, 2004; Talentino, 
2004; Krause and Jutersonke, 2005; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Coyne, 2005; Englebert and Tull, 
2008) share a common description of post-conflict reconstruction/peace-building and 
describe it as efforts to rebuild a state that go beyond ending the conflict and 
demobilizing combatants, and to creating a sustainable and effective government which 
exercises control over the use of force. Coyne (2005:326) further explained what PCR is 
and wrote,  
“Reconstruction should not be confused with state-building, nation 
building or peacekeeping. State building and nation building activities can 
be seen as a subset of reconstruction and involve transferring governance 
capabilities. Likewise, peacekeeping can be seen as a subset of 
reconstruction that involves stabilizing a war-torn society. Reconstruction 
is a broader notion that encompasses these, as well as other, activities”. 
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In Somalia, PCR happened through the 4.5 power sharing mechanism agreed upon in 
2000 by the TNG leadership (Menkhaus, 2007). This mechanism divided power among 
four big family clans and a .5 for minority clans and women.   
 
PRC in Failed/Fragile States:  
This section defines what a failed state is and addresses at the ways PCR efforts 
take place in said states. This is relevant to Somalia because it has been used as the Poster 
child for what a failed state looks like. Gros (1996) and Newman (2009) have discussed 
what constitutes a failed state. Gros (1996: 462) discussed the five contributors to failed 
state, which were about the presence of a weak economy, social division among citizens, 
authoritarianism, militarism, and extensive population growth, which can lead to 
environmental issues. He noted that Siad Barre’s militarism contributed to Somalia’s civil 
war.  
Newman (2009) defined state collapse through the state’s inability to control the 
use of force in its territory or provide services to the citizens within its borders. Somalia 
has experienced this since the collapse of the government in 1991, and therefore has been 
unable to provide services to citizens and implement rule of law in the country. Thiessen 
(2015) suggested that the international community is too hasty to label a country a failed 
state due to their expectation of what a successful state should look like and overlooks 
what a state does provide for its citizens.  
 Diamond (2006) wrote about the aftermath of conflicts and subsequent 
governance rebuilding which takes place. He stated that in order to carry out 
democratization and governance building in failed states, there must first be some sort of 
government with a “set of political institutions that exercise authority over a territory, 
make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and 
maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence” (94). 
Somalia has yet to accomplish any of the requirements he mentions. He also noted that 
within democratic building in failing or failed states, the issues stem from the lack of a 
clear idea of how to build legitimacy.  
One task, which has been rushed by international community in Somalia after the 
establishment of the 2012 government, was producing a constitution (Ingiriis, 2016). 
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Diamond (2006) said that in post-conflict states with presence of violent non-state actors, 
the country cannot afford to rush the time needed to rebuild. Ball (1996) and Diamond 
(2006) have both advocated for more time spent on rebuilding a post-conflict society. 
Ball (1996) suggested there should be more time than the two-year timeframe given to 
states by the international community in the expectation they carry out a full scale 
rebuilding of the state and the establishing of elections. Consequently, it is evident that 
the establishment of the two-year time frame puts constraints on the rebuilding process. 
The implications of imposing this timeframe are that post-conflict reconstruction cannot 
be carried out as effectively as it could be if the timeframe had been extended.    
 
PCR and Power-Sharing  
 Since the end of the Cold War, power-sharing has become the standard approach 
to ending civil war. As Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) discuss, even when the warring 
parties have reached a hurting stalemate, the risks of allowing one’s adversary to gain or 
retain control are too great to abandon the fight. The introduction of a power-sharing pact 
can alleviate that fear by removing or at least reducing the possibility of one faction 
dominating the opposing parties in the post-conflict environment. According to 
Papagianni (2007), power-sharing entails bringing together actors of the conflict, in order 
to agree upon representation in governance and all of its branches. Power-sharing is 
typically utilized in countries where there are issues based on identity such as religion 
and ethnicity. She also suggested that there must be an agreed upon formula for 
representation before power-sharing can take place in a war-torn country and would need 
third party guarantors in order to make the process work.   
Power sharing agreements can take several different forms, and typically divide 
the political, economic, military, or territorial resources of state between the warring 
factions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). According to Hartzell and Hoddie, the most durable 
power sharing pacts are those that divide power across multiple areas of state governance, 
such as political power, economic resources, military or territorial authority (Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2005). Papagianni (2007) discussed executive power, in which power sharing is 
“independent of electoral outcomes” and guarantees specific quotas based on groups. In 
the establishment of the Somali 4.5 power sharing formula, executive power sharing was 
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utilized a in political form, meaning that the division of power followed an already set 
formula, which divided parliamentary seats based on clans in the governmental 
representation. In Somalia, this form of power sharing was utilized to guarantee equal 
representation for the four big clans in order to end the conflict. Somali clans are similar 
social units and function in a comparable manner to ethnic groups present in other 
countries. In the 4.5 Formula, there was no specific allocation of political positions to 
clan in order to insure that each clan would have equal chance of participating in 
governance. Mehler (2009) suggested that power sharing could only work once there has 
been an in-depth debate about the arrangements.  
However, despite the effectiveness of power sharing as a mechanism for ending 
the fighting, scholars have also recognized it can work against peace and the 
consolidation of democracy over the long term. Spears (2000) discussed the issues 
power-sharing mechanisms face before implementation even takes place. He posited that 
actors in the conflict tend to utilize smaller actors of the war to build coalitions to become 
strong enough to defeat those they consider to be their rivals and therefore the intention is 
not to reach peace but to come out on top. He also suggested that actors which believe 
they have sacrificed the most in conflict tend to think they should be the ones ruling the 
country after the conflict has ended. He used the example of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed 
Farah Aidid in the Somali civil war and their use of this scheme to out maneuver one 
another to become the leader in Somalia. Aidid believed that his Hawiye family clan was 
responsible for the defeat of Barre in the civil war and therefore should be ruling the 
country with him as the president.  
Hertzell and Hoddie (2003) address the way in which the number of casualties in 
the war can be a hindrance to how well power-sharing can work. They wrote, “Although 
wars with high casualty raters are extremely costly, we do not expect them to result in 
settlements that prove stable in the long term” (322). In Somalia, an estimated 500,000 
individuals died as a result of the war and this memory still fresh on the minds of 
Somalis. Papagianni (2007) posited that power-sharing mechanisms hinder the evolution 
of politics and put the power in the hands of the elites, which can lead to continued 
mistrust between the members of the government. Despite the success of 4.5 Formula in 
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ending clan infighting, in governance the formula has led to the stagnation of politics and 
an inability to move away from clan based politics.  
Mehler (2009) pointed out power sharing mechanisms are limited in their inability 
to tackle all the complex issues facing a conflict torn country and these processes tend to 
ignore the concerns of minorities in the decision making. This can be seen in the way the 
4.5 Formula has disadvantaged Somali Bantus and minority clans. They have been 
marginalized in politics due to the unequal representation in governance, and this in turn 
has led to difficulties for the government such as lack of legitimacy and democratic 
governance. Next I will provide a brief critique on post-conflict reconstruction efforts.  
In Somalia, democratization occurred after independence with the first civilian 
government, which ended up politicizing clan as the lack of ideological difference 
became apparent (Samatar and Samatar, 1987). Brinkerhoff (2005) wrote about the 
potential issues, which could rise when a state goes through a democratization process. 
Especially with the presence of informal actors, which compete for legitimacy against the 
state due to their ability to provide services for the population unlike the formal weak 
government. In the context of the civil war, this happened in Somali through the re-
emergence of clan elders and the services they provided like security and justice for 
Somalis (Gundel, 2006).  
Krause and Jutersonke (2005) addressed the lack of a clear idea of what success 
entails in peace-building mission and suggested that all peace support missions have 
failed after five years. They pointed out the effect post-conflict peace-building can have 
on both those that intervene in a conflict and the state in which it takes place. It can be 
financially and politically costly for the international community, and domestically, it 
throws the state into disarray by restructuring different institutions and power dynamics. 
In her work, Hellsten (2006) noted that despite a few successful cases, reconstruction 
attempts in war-torn countries, have mostly contributed to further violence.  
Ball (1996) noted the problem of the international two-year timeframe and its 
tendency to rush the peace-building process leads to root causes of conflicts being 
ignored for the sake of accomplishing set goals. Collier et al (2008) in particular address 
the likelihood of democratic elections contributing to conflict. They wrote that within the 
first year of elections, there is a reduction in violence due the antagonists taking part in 
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the process. However, once elections results are not in their favor, they tend to act as 
spoilers. Elmi (2010) addressed this behavior in Somalia through the context of the peace 
negotiations, which took place in multiple conferences in Djibouti, Egypt, and Kenya. 
Elmi (2010) pointed out that there were two types of reactions to these conferences. 
There were clans which felt they were left out because they did not take part in the 
conflict, while other clans increased their violence while the peace processes took place 
as a way to be included and get a seat in the next conference. In this sense, warlords acted 
as spoilers in these peace negotiations. 
Guttal (2005) noted the tendency for the international community to point to the 
lack of liberal democracy and free market as the cause of state failure in developing 
countries, as opposed to the international community dealing with underlying issues such 
as historic disadvantages like colonialism and financial debt. Thiesse (2015) reaffirmed 
this and wrote, “the privileging of internal factors over external ones not only leads the 
failed state discourse to ignore the interplay between domestic and international contexts, 
it also means that the influence of external actors on socio-political crises are ignored” 
(134). To relate dealing with historical issues to Somalia, the hierarchies created within 
clans by colonial actors, as well as the privileging of certain identities over others has had 
consequences on the way Somalis have dealt with one another and has greater 
implications on political stability as well.  
 
Methodology:  
The principal objective of this research is to consider Somali governance, starting 
from post 2012 elections and up until the 2017 election, through a case study. I have 
chosen to use this timeframe as a case study because of the 2012 provisional constitution 
which eliminated the 4.5 Formula. Gerring (2004) defines a case study as, “... an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
units” (342). I chose to do a case study because of its usefulness in understanding a 
complex issue like Somalia and its continued struggle for stable governance. Through 
their work, Bennett and Elman (2007) have confirmed the advantages a case study can 
have when studying a complex issue. In using a case study method, or more specifically 
comparative-historical analysis, I have the flexibility to assess the way clans have 
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interacted with governance in Somalia throughout different time periods. In doing so the 
project will gauge if clans are still part of Somali governance after the 2012 Constitution. 
I employ the concept of post-conflict reconstruction to assess the way clans, as informal 
actors have been part of the government and the role they played in stabilizing the 
country through power sharing mechanisms.   
In order to analyze the role of leadership and clan, my research is conducted 
through the desk review method and through my role as a participant observer. I define 
desk review as using secondary research from online scholarly articles, books, online 
news sources and official documents. Becker and Geer (1957) defined participant 
observation as an individual taking part in the context they are studying while they are 
either undercover or out in the open as researchers. I was in Somalia during the summers 
of 2016 and 2017 and use my personal experience and conversations as part of this 
project. In an effort to consider Somalia more comprehensively, I use the desk review 
method to provide background about Somalia and its current political situation. 
Additionally, this method aids in tying historical background to the present situation in 
Somalia as it relates to leadership and clan in governance.  
I employ Papagianni’s (2007) work, as she addresses the different ways power-
sharing formulas are used to divide power, such as political, economic, and military 
power-sharing mechanisms. Her work is relevant to the project because Somalia’s 4.5 
Formula is based on a political division in power and more specifically through executive 
power sharing. She discusses formula based power sharing and the allocation of power to 
identity groups which are used to analyze the clan aspect of Somalia’s 4.5 Formula. 
Further, Papagianni (2007: 24) suggested that within political power sharing, 
there are four elements which are present. These elements are: “1) Proportional 
representation of all parties in the cabinet and legislature; 2) decision-making by 
consensus and mutual group vetoes on contentious issues; 3) proportional allocation of 
funds and position; and 4) projection of the rights of minority groups.” I assess Somalia’s 
4.5 Formula using these elements and determine which of these elements are present and 
which are missing. Finally, she also discusses the shortcomings of power-sharing 
mechanisms and their tendency to put power in the hands of the majority as well as the 
political stagnation they can contribute to.  
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 I also utilize Ball’s (1996) work and its relevance to my research due to 
Somalia’s status as a state going through a rebuilding process. She identifies two stages 
within the peace process in countries with no outright victors like Somalia, which she 
defines as cessation of conflict and peacebuilding. Cessation of conflict encompasses a 
negotiation process as well as efforts to end hostilities. Further, she posited that within 
peace-building, there is transition and consolidation. The objective of the transition phase 
is to “establish a government with a sufficient degree of legitimacy to operate effectively 
and to implement key reforms mandated by the peace accords” (722). The consolidation 
phase addresses the root causes in conflict and the need for more time than the allowed 
two-year timeframe given by the international community.  
She outlines three important tasks for countries going through peace-building. 
The first task is the importance of rebuilding of the economy. The second task is limiting 
competition for resources by actors in the conflict, in particular natural resources, to fuel 
their agenda. The third task is the building of a security sector and specifically one that is 
democratic and can bridge the gap between security forces and citizens.  
         Finally, I assess Somalia’s current political situation through the two stages 
suggested by Ball (1996) and pinpoint the current stage the state is in within the process 
of rebuilding. 
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Chapter Four: Governance and Post-conflict Reconstruction 
This chapter explores the impact of the 4.5 system on Somalia governance from 
2000 to present day, as well as the implications of its absence on the 2012 provisional 
constitution in Somali politics. The main question I consider is: What role did clan play 
in the establishment of the 2012 constitution with regards to the 4.5 system in Somali 
politics? Sub-questions are: How did the 4.5 formula reflect historical patterns of 
governance in Somalia? What are the implications of the removal of 4.5 system from the 
2012 provisional constitution in Somali politics? 
 This project analyzes the relationship between clan and governance in Somalia. 
The 4.5 formula was implemented as a way to end the civil war and represent the big 
clans in Somalia within governance. The analysis takes into consideration the negative 
political history of how clan and governance have interacted in the past. Leaders who 
have been in control of governance in the past have used the power and resources of the 
state to further personal interests and help one’s own clan. I employ Papagianni’s work in 
terms of the way the 4.5 power sharing mechanism had been implemented in Somalia and 
the issues that were produced by this formula. I also employed Nicole Ball’s framework 
for rebuilding governance to assess the Somali government and whether it has been 
successful. One way this has been done is utilizing Ball’s criteria to assess whether or not 
effective governance has been established in Somalia.  
Attempts at governance rebuilding began as early as 1991; however, some success 
was only gained in 2000 with creation of the 4.5 formula and the establishment of the 
Transitional National Government. The formula was used again in 2004 when the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established, and in 2009 with TFG 2.0, as 
well as the 2012 government with the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS). These 
governments have all faced structural problems such as warlords from the civil war, 
terrorist organizations, and even piracy. The element of clan had been present in the 
process of attempting to reestablish governance. As previously mentioned in the 
background chapter, clan affiliation is an important part of the Somali identity and 
however its relevance in governance grew after independence as it became apparent that 
it could be used as a tool to gain prestige and power.  
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The Somali Governance since 2012 
This part of the analysis covers the governments that have been elected in 2012 
and again 2017.  In 2012, for the first time in two decades the government in Somalia 
was internationally recognized with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud a former educator and civil 
society worker as the president. At the time Somalia had been dealing with Al-Shabaab 
while attempting to rebuild governance. President Mohamud promptly laid out goals in 
order to stabilize Somalia. Brown and Fisher (2013:6) wrote,  
“The president quickly outlined his priorities as a Six Pillar Plan: 1) Create 
stability in the country; 2) speed up economic recovery; 3) build peace and 
remove the main drivers of conflict; 4) improve government capacity by 
improving service delivery; 5) increase international partnerships and create 
closer ties with neighbours; and 6) unity at home”.  
 
Mohamud made the eradication of Al-Shabaab a priority for his government, attempted 
to strengthen the relationship with the international community, and centralize the 
government by attempting to appoint the leadership of regions like Jubbaland (Brown and 
Fisher, 2013). Ingiriis (2016:63) noted that Mohamud began to shift from a centralized 
form of government in Mogadishu to a more federal based system due to external 
international pressure. He wrote,  
“Torn between the expectations of his state authority and the requirements 
of his donors, Hassan Sheikh sought to consolidate his power in the face 
of aid donors, known as partners--conditioning economic assistance for 
the government’s ability to reach a number of benchmarks, the hardest of 
which is to implement federal state-formation projects consistent with 
other autonomous or semiautonomous mini states”.  
 
Nevertheless, it is also important note the bad experiences Somalis have had with 
centralization of government, especially in previous governments like Barre’s regime. 
Barre’s regime, as discussed in the background chapter, utilized clan as a tool for 
collective punishment as well as collective rewards for those that were in his in-group.  
Reitano and Shaw (2013) noted the presence of natural sources such as oil in 
Somalia and the way this has affected the politics of Somalia. President Mohamud in his 
attempts to preserve stability in Somalia addressed international oil companies, which 
had been making deals with regional governments for the rights to their oil reserves. He 
warned the companies that such agreements would not be honored. Balthasar (2014) 
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suggested that although the rest of the world saw new and improved governance in 
Somalia under Mohamud presidency, remnants of older practices in Somali politics were 
still present. The government came to power the same way its predecessors had with the 
4.5 clan representatives electing the parliamentarians which in turn elected Mohamud.  
During the elections there were also accusations of buying votes.   
In February of 2017, Somalia welcomed a new president, Mohamed Abdullahi 
Mohamed (Farmaajo). According to Aglionby (2017) the Farmaajo victory signaled to a 
change in Somali politics since he was considered to be one of the least corrupt 
candidates by both members of government and the population. The Somali people were 
jubilant about his campaign promises to tackle issues such as famine. However, Sheikh 
and Houreld (2017) noted the domestic instability brought on by Farmaajo’s time in 
office. They pointed to the impeachment brought against him in court for accusation such 
as violating the constitution and inciting violence in the country by attempting to arrest 
members of elite and in turn potentially bringing back wars between clans. Although 
these arrests are political and not clan related, they have the potential to plunge the 
country back into clan-based war.  
 
PCR (Traditional Systems) and Governance  
 In the background chapter of the project I have presented the relationship between 
clan and governance in a historical context. It is evident that clan is a very important 
aspect of Somali identity and governance. Dating back to the role of the clan prior to 
colonization as a way of life to the politicization process it has gone through in different 
period of governance (Gundel, 2006 and Jama, 2007). Based on the finding of this 
research, it became clear that clan has been used by leaders whether they be the 
colonizers of Somalia as a way to divide and rule the Somali people (Samatar and 
Samatar, 1987; Besteman, 1996; Gundel, 2006; Jama, 2007; Njoku, 2013) or within 
governance before and after independence by Somali leaders like the SYL, 
parliamentarians, Barre, and warlords (Samatar and Samatar, 1987; Mukhtar, 1989; 
Samatar, 1992; Prunier, 1996; Luling, 1997; Elmi and Baris; 2006; Ahmed and Green, 
1999; Adowa, 2013).  
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 Clan and the traditional xeer system have been a consistent part of Somali history. 
The positive and negative roles clan has taken on have depended on those in charge of the 
governance of Somalia. Elmi and Barise (2006) and Leonard and Samatar (2011) have 
pointed out the fluidity of clan in Somalia, which is evident in the use of clan by different 
leaders throughout Somalia’s political history.  
 Paffneholz and Spurk (2006) and Barnes (2009) have discussed the importance of 
informal actors in the reconstruction process of post-conflict states. Lundy and 
McGovern (2008) as well as Parver and Wolf (2008) have emphasized the importance of 
local participation and ownership in PCR efforts and warned that exclusion of these 
groups can stagnate progress. Morgan (2005) and Barnes (2009) in particular have 
addressed the participation of traditional leaders and groups in PCR and the importance 
of their unique perspective in conflict.   
Distinguishing the importance of clan and its role in Somali society is essential to 
understanding Somalia and Somalis. Prior to colonization, clan and the xeer system 
presented a way of life for Somalis and although violence was part of life, through these 
systems Somalis found justice and protection (Adam, 1992; Gundel, 2006; Jama 2006). 
In later periods clan was utilized by the leadership for personal gain in power and 
resources (Samatar and Samatar, 1987; Jama, 2007). In the civil war period clan elders 
began to be viewed in a positive manner due to their ability to provide justice and 
protection once again in the absence of a central government (Gundel, 2006). In the more 
recent attempts of governance particularly in the early 2000s, the representation of clan 
was used a strategy to enact power-sharing mechanisms and to attempt to bring back 
some stability to Somalia (Menkhaus, 2014).   
The 4.5 Power-sharing Formula and The Somali Constitution  
This section of the analysis addresses the 2012 constitution and the reign of clan 
influence despite the removal of the 4.5 system. The Somali provisional constitution was 
adopted in 2012 and states that the Somali government is based on a federal power-
sharing system between members states. The constitution also states that the reach of the 
Somali government in its laws are applied to the skeletal state of Somalia, this means that 
it also includes the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland. Kouroutakis (2014) 
wrote, “The constitution was adopted with the aim of terminating a long period of 
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tensions, warfare, political turmoil, and often chaos, by establishing efficient political 
institutions and introducing governance that is more responsive and accountable to its 
people” (Kouroutakis: 1196). 
The constitution, I found, presented a very liberal and inclusive government and 
points to a state which intends to practice democratic governance. In the constitution it 
states that the Somali government should promote human rights along with inclusive 
governance. There are three branches of authority consisting of the legislature, executive 
and an independent judiciary intended to balance power and be accountable. In Article 11 
of the constitution, it says, “All citizens, regardless of sex, religion, social and economic 
status, political opinion, clan, disability, occupation, birth or dialect shall have equal 
rights and duties before the law” (Som. Const).  
 Somalia is now a federal government containing states like Jubbaland, Gamudug, 
Puntland, the South West State of Somalia, Hir-Shabelle and Somaliland. The 
constitution states that there are two levels of governance in Somalia, the federal 
government level and the member states level. There have been distinctions made 
between the different aspects of control like any other federal state. It also states that the 
federal government has control over matters dealing with foreign affairs, national 
defense, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy (Som. Const.art.54). The 
powers at the state level are still being developed.  
The constitution does not mention of the 4.5 power-sharing model and this signals 
a move away from clan-based governance and to the establishment of one person, one 
vote, giving individuals the power to vote themselves as opposed to clan representatives. 
President Mohamud’s government had committed to establishing the structures needed to 
allow for direct voting by 2016 as initially planned. Crouch and Njagi (2017) stated, 
“However, political delays and disputes greatly impeded process, and as a result many of 
the necessary milestones were not achieved in time to hold elections in 2016, including 
boundary demarcation and finalisation of the constitution” (4-5). The government instead 
expanded the number of delegates taking part in the election process.  
In the 2012 elections, 271 members of parliament were elected by 135 elders 
utilizing the 4.5 formula to vote for the president. However in the 2017 elections, the 
elections took place on two levels of government, which were the House of the People or 
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Lower House and the Upper House. Crouch and Njagi (2017) wrote, “In attempt to make 
the selections more democratic and to mitigate corruption, the National Leaders Forum 
(NLF) expanded the electorate to 14,025 delegates, who formed 275 electoral colleges 
comprising 51 electors for each parliamentary seat” (5). It was through this process that 
President Farmaajo was elected.  
 
Reality of 4.5  
The Somali government under President Farmaajo still has not established the 
mechanisms needed to move way from 4.5 power sharing system. Ainte (2014) addressed 
the lack of a permanent constitution that was meant to be adopted in 2016 and include 
input from the public. As of 2018, civil participation in elections has yet to be 
implemented, but continues to be a topic of discussion at the federal government level. 
He also noted that Somalis both in the country and in the diaspora perceived the 4.5 
model as unfair and undemocratic. He wrote, “Many Somalis see the 4.5 power-sharing 
formula as crude and simplistic. Marginalised groups and minority clans in particular 
perceive it as having reduced their political representation and access to authority” (62). 
Mehler (2009) warned about the marginalization of minorities taking place in countries 
utilizing power-sharing because within the initial decision making, these groups are not 
presented at the negotiation table and therefore are left out. 
The Somali 4.5 formula is based on power sharing mechanism which allocates 
power based on parliamentary seats in the government. As Papagianni (2007) noted, 
power sharing mechanisms can lead to the stagnation of politics. To relate this to 
Somalia, the power sharing mechanism of the 4.5 system solidified clan identity in 
politics, which resulted in stagnation. Despite the 4.5 formula being utilized for over a 
decade and half, it has been unable to bring the stability needed to build a legitimate 
functional government. The Somali government has yet to gain legitimacy of power in its 
territory. Papagianni (2007) pointed to the way power-sharing puts power in the hands of 
those who perpetuated conflict, making them legitimate actors in governance. To tie this 
back to the political sphere of Somalia, by giving former warlords a place in the 
government, they were able to establish themselves as legitimate actors in governance.  
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In utilizing Papagianni (2007: 24) and her four elements of political power 
sharing, it is evident that “proportional representation” and “protection of minorities” are 
not present in Somalia. The 4.5 formula already puts large groups of Somalis at a 
disadvantage based on historical discrimination which allocates less power to them. It is 
important to note that the other two elements of “mutual vetoes” on issues and “allocation 
of funds and positions” are not applicable to the Somali 4.5 power-sharing formula.  
In a similar vein, both Cox (2001) and Rosiny (2015) have discussed the way 
power-sharing mechanisms in Bosnia and Lebanon have put political power in the hands 
of former parties to the conflict. Cox (2001) noted that in Bosnia, the power sharing in 
the Dayton Agreement was between the warring parties of the Croats, Serbs, and 
Bosniaks. He says that these groups ended up with a state in which the economic 
development was at a standstill and the public funds were used for surveillance and for 
political parties. Rosiny (2015) addressed the situation in Lebanon and how the Ti’af 
agreement actually allowed former warlords to become part of the government through 
the guarantees of power sharing and gain power in ways they could not have in civil war.   
This power-sharing system has brought back old practices of Somali politicians 
like looting public funds as well as buying votes to gain power. Gettleman (2017) while 
addressing the recent 2017 election in Somalia, wrote, “Somali investigators estimate that 
at least $20 million has feverishly changed hands during parliamentary parliamentary 
elections that will culminate in the selection of the president on Wednesday”(2). He also 
noted that this practice has been normalized that clan elders believe they would lose the 
respect and trust of their clan members if they do not accept bribery for their votes. When 
I was in Somalia, this topic generated so much debate. The buying of votes is not 
something that is hidden and if someone loses the election, most people justify the loss in 
two ways, either that it was based on clan rivalry or more likely that they did not have 
enough money to buy into the government.  
 
Ball Framework and Governance  
In this section I utilize Nicole Ball’s work to analyze the attempts at building the 
capacity of the government after the 2012 constitutional and the attempts to move away 
from clan governance. First I assess Somalia’s attempts at peacemaking during the civil 
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war through the two stages Ball (1996) identifies within the peace process. Second, I use 
Ball’s (1996) three tasks of peace-building to pinpoint Somalia’s progress and assess 
whether there have been implemented successfully. Finally, I assess the relationship 
between the international community and Somalia in rebuilding governance.  
 
Cessation of Conflict and Transition 
Ball (1996) identified two stages within the peace process in countries with no 
outright victors like Somalia. The first stage is the cessation of conflict, in which the 
objective is to end violence between parties of the conflict and negotiate. In Somalia, this 
stage has been accomplished to some extent but no yet fully realized. Since 1991, 
violence between parties has persisted in one way or another. First it was between clans 
during the civil war and later between the government and insurgent groups like Al-
Shabaab and warlords. In case of clans in the civil war, cessation of conflict occurred in 
2000 when the TNG was established and the 4.5 clan power sharing system was adopted. 
However, this peace did not last long and within a year and half of governance, warlords, 
which were left out of the peace process acted as spoilers (Le Sage, 2002). It was not 
until 2000, when negotiations took place and were somewhat successful, which led to the 
current form of government that is in place. In regards to of Al-Shabaab, the government 
has not attempted to hold negotiations since the conflict between the two is still fresh.  
The second stage identified by Ball (1996) is the peace-building stage, which 
encompasses the transition and consolidation phase. In the transition phase, the objective 
is to build a legitimate and capable government. For the past 18 years, Somalia has been 
attempting to accomplish this objective; however, it still has yet to produce a government 
with “adequate legitimacy” and the rule of law behind it. After the 2012 constitution was 
initiated, the objective became to build the mechanisms needed for a durable governance 
such as civil participation through direct elections and accountability, which have not 
been established as observed in the shortcomings of former president Mohamud’s 
government.  
The consolidation phase addresses the root causes of the conflict and in Somalia, 
these issues have stemmed from the misuse of Somali identity in terms of clan by leaders 
in the first government and particularly in Barre’s regime. Although reconciliation 
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conferences have been held to address the horrific ways clan has been utilized by the 
leadership, it has yet to bear fruit. I had the privilege of taking part in a reconciliation 
process in the summer of 2017 and witnessed that people were still referring to their 
memories of the atrocious acts by the former government.   
 
Ball’s PCR Tasks  
In this part, I use Ball’s tasks to assess whether PCR efforts have been successful. 
Ball (1996) outlined three important tasks for rebuilding states, which have experienced a 
civil conflict. The first task is the rebuilding of the economy; previously, Barre had 
monopolized the economy during his regime (Leonard and Samatar, 2011). Although the 
economy suffered at the beginning of the civil war, the sector actually began to improve 
and grow in the aftermath of state collapse (Powell et al, 2008). The second task deals 
with limiting competition for natural resources by actors in the conflict as a way to 
prevent the use of resources to fuel their agenda. In Somalia, the management of 
resources and the way they can be purchased have been crafted into the constitution. In 
doing so, the government wants to limit the involvement of foreign actors and deals made 
with them by certain communities which could consequently9 impact the whole country. 
The third task is the building of a security sector and specifically one that is democratic 
and can bridge the gap between security forces and citizens. Somalia’s security in the 
past decade has been reliant on the African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) forces 
and as pointed out by Tawane (2017) has yet to accomplish building an effective and 
sufficient force.  
 
The International Community and Somalia  
Ball (1996) also discussed the relationship war-torn societies can build with the 
international donor community. Somalia has maintained a strong relationship with the 
international community since the collapse of the government through the presence of 
civil society organizations such as NGOs and IGOs. Multiple PCR efforts led by the 
international community have also taken place. Prior to 2012, aid from the donor 
community had gone through Somali based NGOs. In recent times, this relationship has 
become politicized, in that the donor community has set up requirements for the 
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government in order to receive aid (Ingiriis, 2016). The International community’s 
involvement in Somalia has taken on a different role more recently. Kouroutakis (2014) 
noted that the constitutional making was hasty and was mostly carried out by the UN 
with little involvement from Somali civil society due to the UN’s believe that they were 
not as engaged as they needed to be. Another way international actors have been involved 
is through the backing of certain candidates to make business deals such as Turkey taking 
over the Mogadishu port (Gettlemen, 2017).  In Somalia, there was also interaction and 
competition between different NGOs on the ground in terms of competing for funding 
from the donor community and declaring certain issues under their jurisdiction. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations  
The relationship between Somali leadership and clan as a political tool began 
before the establishment of the modern Somali state (Tripodi, 1999). Jama (2007) pointed 
out clan became politicized before independence during colonialism, when clan elders 
were used as indirect rulers for the colonizers. The colonial powers in this process created 
hierarchies, which could be perceived as perhaps the initiation of the interaction between 
clan and politics. This relationship, in one way or another, has continued in Somali 
political history and became more prominent after the state became independent. Samatar 
and Samatar (1987) have pointed to the lack of ideological difference that led to Somali 
politicians utilizing clan as a way to gain power. Samatar (1997) and Luling (1997) 
among many other scholars have covered the use of clan by Barre’s regime and the 
extreme divide he created, which led to the civil war and, in turn, to the protracted state 
failure in Somalia. Somalia today is still to some extent a collapsed state despite the 
presence of an internationally recognized government. This is due to the government's 
inability to take control of the country or provide services to its citizens. 
The background chapter the project began by laying out the origins of the power-
sharing mechanism Somalia has been using to elect leadership in government. The 
chapter also covered the political history of Somalia and exemplified the way clan has 
been part of governance in much of Somalia’s modern history. In doing so the chapter 
showed how political turmoil was caused by the leadership’s use of clan as a political 
tool. Barre’s regime is notorious for utilizing this relationship in the most extreme of 
manners. His rule in Somalia lasted 21 years, and in that time, he managed to take the 
relationship between clan and politics further in practicing  ‘clan state,’ meaning that he 
attempted to create a state where his clan was on top and especially those from his sub-
clan along with his mothers and son-in -law’s sub-clans. He also committed horrific acts 
along clan lines like the bombing of Hargeisa in order to eliminate the Isaaq family clan 
based on the actions of a few. These acts led to political factions being created in both the 
north and the south to fight against him and eventually topple his regime and begin the 
civil war period.   
During the civil war, the country experienced warlords, which again led to the use 
of clan by faction leaders to divide the Somali people and fight against one another in the 
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name of clan. The conflict of warlords lasted until mid-2000s when conflict turned into 
one between the Transitional Federal Government assisted by a U.S. backed Ethiopia and 
later on AMISOM and against Al-Shabaab. This form of the conflict still exists today 
between the Federal Government of Somalia, which is still backed by AMISOM while it 
attempts to build the capacity of its armed forces and Al-Shabaab.   
 In the third chapter, the role of clan as both a social identity and a political one 
was laid out in an attempt to give the reader a comprehensive idea of the way clan 
functions. Furthermore, PCR was utilized to assess the success of the power-sharing 
formula in Somalia and what this has meant for rebuilding efforts. I have concluded that 
this formula has worked against the Somali government in the sense of capacity building 
and creating legitimacy. I have also used PCR in connection with informal governance 
when addressing the role of clans in peace building efforts. Clan elders have been key 
actors in the aftermath of the civil war, in that they have provided services and security to 
the Somali people in the absence of a central government. 
 In utilizing Ball (1996) to analyze the current state of politics in Somalia, I have 
pointed out that in terms of the stages in the peace process in Ball’s work, the 
government has attempted to end violence without much success. Al-Shabaab still carries 
out deadly attacks in the heart of Mogadishu. In terms of determining success when it 
comes to peace negotiations in Somalia, the 2000 peace agreement and the existence of 
the current government can be used as evidence of this. However, the 4.5 power-sharing 
can also be perceived to be working against the establishment of an effective government. 
As pointed out by scholars like Papagianni (2007) and Mehler (2009) along with many 
others, power sharing might be a useful transitional tool, however, if there is no progress 
made to implement an effective democratic government, then the state is in danger of 
being stagnant in both politics and development.   
I have also used Ball’s peace-building tasks to assess the progress of rebuilding. 
Somalia’s economy sector seems to be growing in respective of the government, this is 
evidenced in that economic the growth began before the establishment of the current 
state. Ball (1996) discussed the relationship between rebuilding and the international 
community, I have pointed to the way the IC’s requirements can actually hinder the 
growth of the state and provided the example of president Mohamud’s government and 
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the abandonment of his goals in order to focus IC approved tasks like constitutional 
reform. There have also been other external actors, which have established relationships 
with politicians as a way to gain access to Somali resources.  
 
Recommendations:   
 In modern Somali political history, both the negative or positive roles taken on by 
clan were connected to certain actors. Through the research process, I have come to the 
conclusion that use of clan identity has been useful in the stabilization efforts during the 
civil war with the establishment of an agreed upon power-sharing mechanism. However, 
the 4.5 power sharing system has stood in the way of progression for the country.  
Recommendation one:   
Although the 4.5 system of governance is not an official part of the government 
and is absent from the 2012 constitution, it is a reality. The big clans still dominate the 
government and vote based on this system that privileges some above others. The best of 
course of action is to implement the constitutions, which already states in Article 1, that 
the federal government is one that represents all equally and pursues democratic and 
social justice values.  
Recommendation two:  
The next steps taken by the government should be to set a guideline for 
participation in governance in a general manner rather than postponing it again and 
creating a complex system as they had done before the 2017 elections. The government 
should establish the structure needed to allow for one person-one vote in time for the next 
election in 2021. This might take some time due to the lack of security and development 
in Somalia but should still be a priority.  
Recommendation three:  
 In order to have a more legitimate and secure Somalia, the government should 
focus on building capacity of both the governmental institutions and security rather than 
solely relying on the clan power-sharing to keep peace between the clan families. The 
lack of legitimacy in the government stems from its inability to secure the country and 
defeat Al-Shabaab. The government must, put in, more efforts in strengthening the forces 
of the state and taking over the security of the state instead of relying on AMISOM, the 
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state would be able to gain back some legitimacy, which could potentially pave the way 
for a more stable Somalia. 
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